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We present a global analysis of the spread of recently 
emerged SARS-CoV-2 variants and estimate changes 
in effective reproduction numbers at country-specific 
level using sequence data from GISAID. Nearly all 
investigated countries demonstrated rapid replace-
ment of previously circulating lineages by the World 
Health Organization-designated variants of concern, 
with estimated transmissibility increases of 29% (95% 
CI: 24–33), 25% (95% CI: 20–30), 38% (95% CI: 29–48) 
and 97% (95% CI: 76–117), respectively, for B.1.1.7, 
B.1.351, P.1 and B.1.617.2.
Recent months have seen the emergence and rapid 
spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants associated with 
increased transmissibility, including the World Health 
Organization (WHO)-designated variants of con-
cern (VOC) Alpha (hereafter referred to using the 
Phylogenetic Assignment of Named Global Outbreak 
(Pango) lineage designation B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), 
Gamma (P.1) and Delta (B.1.617.2), as well as multiple 
variants of interest (VOI) [1]. By 3 June 2021, B.1.1.7 had 
been reported from at least 160 countries, B.1.351 from 
113 countries, P.1 from 64 countries and B.1.617.2 from 
62 countries [1]. We present an analysis of the effective 
reproduction number and global spread of SARS-CoV-2 
variants with data available by 3 June 2021.
Effective reproduction number estimates
We analysed 1,722,652 SARS-CoV-2 sequences 
uploaded to the Global Initiative On Sharing All 
Influenza Data (GISAID) hCoV-19 database [2], consid-
ering only VOC or VOI reported at least 25 times in at 
least three countries (see  Supplementary Tables S1 
and S2 for sequence numbers per variant per country). 
GISAID sequences used for this work are acknowledged 
in Supplement 2. We used a multinomial logistic model 
of competitive growth to estimate the effective repro-
duction number of each variant relative to that of 
the non-VOC/VOI viral population for each reporting 
country. We assumed that the generation time of VOC/
VOI remained unchanged compared with previously cir-
culating variants. Further details on the methods, as 
well as an exploration of the sensitivity of our results 
to the assumption of an unchanged generation time, 
can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Despite differences between countries, our analysis 
showed a statistically significant increase in the pooled 
mean effective reproduction number relative to non-
VOC/VOI of B.1.1.7 at 29% (95% confidence interval 
(CI): 24–33), B.1.351 at 25% (95% CI: 20–30), P.1 at 38% 
(95% CI: 29–48) and B.1.617.2 at 97% (95% CI: 76–117) 
(Figure 1). Of the six variants currently designated as 
VOI, five were considered in our analysis and among 
these, only B.1.617.1 and B.1.525 demonstrated a sta-
tistically significant increase in the effective reproduc-
tion number of 48% (95% CI: 28–69) and 29% (95% 
CI: 23–35), respectively. In line with these estimates, 
our results showed rapid replacement of previously cir-
culating variants by VOC/VOI in nearly all countries; of 
the 64 countries considered in this analysis, we esti-
mate VOC/VOI to be the most frequently circulating lin-
eage on the last day of available data in 52 countries, 
the most common variants being B.1.1.7 (40 countries) 
and B.1.617.2 (India, Singapore, United Kingdom and 
Australia) (Figure 2, Supplementary Figures S1 and S2).
 
Given the widespread co-circulation of VOC/VOI, we 
also compared the effective reproduction numbers of 
these variants against each in order to estimate the 
nature of future competitive growth between them 
(Figure 3, excluding P.2 and B.1.427/B.1.429). Notably, 
the pooled mean difference in the effective produc-
tion number between the VOC B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 was 
small at 4% (95% CI: 0–8), while P.1 demonstrated an 
increase relative to B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 of 10% (95% CI: 
3–17) and 17% (95% CI: 6–30). Given these estimates, 
the longer-term trends of competitive growth between 
these three VOC remain unclear.
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In contrast, the rapid observed growth of B.1.617.2 
suggests a clear competitive advantage compared 
with B.1.1.7, B.1.351 and P.1, with estimated increases 
in the effective reproduction number of 55% (95% 
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Discussion
In this analysis we have highlighted the global spread 
of SARS-CoV-2 variants and estimated their relative 
transmission rates. Given our estimates and all other 
factors remaining constant, B.1.617.2 is expected to 
rapidly outcompete other variants and become the 
dominant circulating lineage over the coming months.
These estimates must be considered in light of poten-
tial sources of bias in estimating effective reproduc-
tion numbers from proportions calculated from GISAID 
data. Firstly, individual country estimates are likely to 
be biased as data are often not representative of the 
variants circulating in the country and the metadata 
required to account for this are generally not avail-
able. Although sequences labelled as being obtained 
from incoming travellers were assigned to the country 
of departure in these analyses, bias could still have 
been introduced if reported sequences disproportion-
ately represented clusters and regions with known cir-
culation of a given variant. This applies especially to 
B.1.617.1 and B.1.617.2, which have only recently been 
declared VOC/VOI and are subject to targeted sequenc-
ing for example in the United Kingdom (UK) [3].
Secondly, bias can be introduced by founder effects 
where variants introduced into populations with locally 
elevated transmission can increase in proportion at a 
national level without a bona fide transmission advan-
tage. Once again, this bias is most likely to affect 
the B.1.617 sublineages, as these variants have only 
recently been introduced in most countries and may 
still be circulating in the founder demographic, while 
variants introduced earlier are likely to be circulating in 
the wider population. Given these two sources of bias, 
our estimates for B.1.617.1 and B.167.2 probably repre-
sent an upper limit on the true value.
Furthermore, we assume that the delays between sam-
pling and submission to GISAID are independent of the 
variant; if this is not the case, variant proportions in 
recent GISAID data will be biased towards variants with 
shorter submission delays. Finally, the country weight-
ings in the pooled transmissibility estimates consider 
only the number of sequences submitted and not the 
size of the actual epidemics in each country, biasing 
estimates towards countries with higher sequencing 
capacity.
However, in spite of these limitations, the average 
trends observed across a number of countries with 
different sequencing strategies and epidemiological 
contexts are likely to be robust to these sources of 
bias and representative of true increases in the effec-
tive reproduction number, consistent with results 
from epidemiological studies from various countries 
[4,5]; our transmissibility estimates are therefore 
Figure 1
Estimated change in effective reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2 variants relative to non-variants, 64 countries, data 































R: effective reproduction number; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; VOC: variant of concern; VOI: variant of 
interest.
Points and lines represent the mean and 95% confidence intervals. Coloured: pooled estimate (random effects model); grey: individual 
country estimates. GISAID sequences used for this work are acknowledged in Supplement 2.
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most reliable for variants reported in many countries 
(see  Supplementary Tables S1 and S2). For B.1.617.2, 
our estimate of a 55% (95% CI: 43–68) increase in the 
effective reproduction number compared with B.1.1.7 is 
marginally greater than but has overlapping CI with the 
increase in the secondary attack rate of 42% (95% CI: 
36–48) estimated from epidemiological investigations 
in the UK [6].
It is important to note that our analysis cannot distin-
guish between a genuine increase in transmissibility 
(i.e. the basic reproduction number) and immune eva-
sion as explanations for higher effective reproduction 
numbers. For variants with relevant levels of immune 
evasion, as potentially observed for B.1.351 [7], the 
future nature of competitive growth with other variants 
will depend on the immune context, both infection- and 
vaccine-derived, of each country under consideration.
The more rapid growth and widespread prevalence 
of VOC pose challenges to the control of SARS-CoV-2 
worldwide, especially with the recent emergence of 
B.1.617.2. Despite the emergence and rapid replace-
ment by more transmissible VOC, several countries 
have successfully reduced SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
with the use of available and proven public health and 
social measures (PHSM). Evidence has shown that the 
higher transmissibility of VOC has required increases 
in the duration or stringency of PHSM (as elaborated in 
the WHO interim guidance [8]) in order to achieve the 
same levels of reduction as before VOC circulation [9]. 
The increased transmissibility of VOC will probably also 
lead to a higher community immunity threshold, which 
may additionally mean that PHSM may need to be main-
tained for longer periods of time as vaccines are being 
rolled out. As the virus continues to evolve, the degree 
of protection offered by the different vaccines against 
future VOC/VOI remains unclear; vaccination coverage 
Figure 2
Empirical and modelled variant proportions of SARS-CoV-2 variants over time, 15 countries, data until 3 June 2021
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SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
Points and lines represent stacked empirical variant proportions, coloured areas between lines represent absolute empirical proportions, 
error bars represent multinomial 95% confidence intervals. Smoothed coloured areas represent stacked modelled variant proportions, white 
areas represent 95% confidence intervals of the modelled estimates. Darker shaded areas therefore represent overlap between empirical and 
modelled estimates. VOC are indicated in bold text, VOI in plain text.
Countries were selected to represent different geographical regions; estimates for all countries are provided in the Supplementary Figures 
S1 and S2). Countries, territories and areas as reported in GISAID do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of World 
Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area or of its authorities. GISAID sequences used for this work are 
acknowledged in Supplement 2.
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Figure 3
Effective reproduction number of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern/interest compared against each other, 64 countries, data 




































































R: effective reproduction number; VOC: variant of concern; VOI: variant of interest.
Small points and thin lines represent country-specific mean and 95% confidence intervals of the change in the effective reproduction number 
of the variant indicated in the top row relative to the variant indicated in the column on the right (confidence intervals are too narrow to be 
visible for some estimates). Diamonds and thick lines represent the mean and 95% confidence of the pooled estimate across all countries 
(random effects model). VOC are indicated in bold text, VOI in plain text. GISAID sequences used for this work are acknowledged in 
Supplement 2.
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targets themselves may need to be revised [10]. Lastly, 
given that higher transmissibility has increased case 
numbers in countries where VOC are circulating and 
the fact that some VOC are suggested to be associ-
ated with higher rates of hospitalisation and mortality 
[11], the burden on healthcare systems per coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) case is likely to increase, although 
this effect will depend on vaccination coverage and 
efficacy.
The convergent evolution of mutations thought to be 
associated with higher transmissibility or immune 
escape in VOC (e.g. N501Y, E484K) highlights the fact 
that variants will probably continue to emerge under 
selective pressures such as PHSM and population 
immunity [7]. The emergence of new variants threatens 
the effectiveness of vaccines and requires constant 
evaluation of available diagnostic, therapeutic, PHSM 
and vaccination strategies as the COVID-19 pandemic 
continues. The WHO has established a SARS-CoV-2 
Virus Evolution Working group to critically evaluate 
variants and a Global Risk Assessment and Monitoring 
Framework for SARS-CoV-2 variants to harmonise the 
decision-making processes for assessing the impact of 
VOC on public health and medical interventions [12].
Conclusion
Rapid replacement means that epidemiological assess-
ment of new VOI must be conducted quickly and regu-
larly if PHSM are to continue to reduce the spread of 
SARS-CoV-2. Given limitations and inherent delays in 
detecting emerging variants and investigating their 
phenotypic impacts, the use and adjustment of PHSM 
should continue to be informed by traditional epidemi-
ological surveillance. Critically, the capacity to detect 
and respond to new variants requires continued efforts 
to enhance surveillance and sequencing capacity glob-
ally. Enhanced efforts are needed to ensure better geo-
graphical representativeness of available SARS-CoV-2 
sequences and the rapid sharing of sequences and 
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